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ORTHODOXY AND THE NEW RUSSIA 
Jonathan Clarke and Duncan Reid 
Jonathan Clarke now teaches Russian at the Unive�:<ity of 
Melbourne and is associated with the Contemporary Europe Research 
Centre (CERC) there. He was .formerly Lecturer in Russian at Monash 
University, where he taught courses in Russian and Slavic linguistics. Dr 
Clarke is now engaged in research in the field of Russian cultural studies, 
with particulcu· reference to post-Soviet Russi.a, as well as in Slavic 
linguistics. 
Duncan Reid, ThD (Tiibingen) and MEd. formerly Dean of the 
United Faculty of Theology, Melbourne, is research scholar at Melbourne 
College of Divinity and Priest-in-Charge at St. George's Anglican Church. 
Flemington Austalia. He has participated in numerous ecumenical activities, 
including currently serving on the International Anglican-Orthodox 
Commission for Theological Dialogue. His numerous publications include 
"East and West in Dialogue with Post-Modernity", in L. Crosss. ed. 
Oriefllale Lumen 2: Australasia and Oceania. (Strathjield NSW. 2004) 3-20. 
Abstract: This paper examines the contempormy phenomenon of the re­
emergence of the Orthodox Church not only as the leading religious 
institution of post-Soviet Russia, but also as a core marker of identity. The 
disappearance of the Soviet Union has produced a profound crisis of idemity 
in Russia. Traditional markers of identity, particularly the Orthodox Church, 
have assumed an importance hardly anticipated before the collapse of the 
USSR. 
The demise of the Soviet Union was one of the cataclysmic events of the late 
twentieth century. Hardly predicted even a few years before it occurred, it ushered in a new 
chapter in the long and turbulent history of Russia.' But the new sovereign state that emerged 
as the Russian Federation (Rossiiskaiafederatsiia) remains an enigma for many observers: it 
appears to share significant characteristics of Western countries while displaying unexpected 
and prominent features that set it apart. One of these distinguishing features is a widespread 
devotion to religion that finds its expression in the Orthodox Ch\lrch. In the paper that 
1 The same can bes.aid mutati_y muumdis of the other independent states that appeared on the territory of 
the fol'lner Soviet U1li01l after Lhe collapse of the USSR. There is no suggestion that Russia and the Soviet Union 
should be considered coterminous. 
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follows we shall examine the phenomenon of contemporary Orthodoxy and the reasons for its 
re-emergence an important marker of Russian identity in the post-Soviet period. 
Axiomatic to our argument is the understanding of religious doctrine enunciated by 
the American Lutheran theologian George Lindbeck. Doctrines, he says, function primarily 
'nor as expressive symbols or truth claims, but as communally authoritative rules of 
discourse, attitude and action'.' Religion is thus to be understood as a cultural-linguistic 
phenomenon, and 'like a culture or language it is a communal phenomenon that shapes the 
subjectivitics of individuals rather than being primarily a manifestation of these 
subjectivitics'.3 There is thus an intuitive sense of how to be religious that is learned in the 
way children Jearn their own mother tongue. To learn this as an adult requires learning the 
doctrinal 'grammar', and the practice is never quite as natural and unstudied as the practice of 
the child or the one who has learnt a� a child. The Orthodox Church in contemporary Russia 
has three or four generations to catechise who have not leamt their own doctrinal language in 
this immediate and artless way. It would be a mistake for western observers to underestimate 
the difficulty of this task, or to presume to assess or judge the Russian Orthodox Church 
without some attempt themselves to enter this intuitive dimension of what is or is not 
appropriate speech or behaviour. Lindbeck was thus able to foresee the present catechetical 
task of the Russian 01thodox Church in the post-Soviet context in which large numbers of 
people seek something to fill the 'moral vacuum'' of post-Soviet Russia: 'to become 
religious ... is to interiorize a set of skills by practice and training .... The primary knowledge 
is not about the religion, nor that the religion teaches such and such, but rather how to be 
religious in such and such ways,_s 
The Place of Orthodox Christianity in Russian Culture 
The current prominence of the Orthodox Church is not entirely new. The church has 
long held a special place in the religious and cultural life of Russia. It has been a rich source 
of spirituality and has had a deep influence on creativity of all kinds: literature, music, art, 
2 George Lindbeck, The Noture of Doclrine: religion and rheology in a post liberal oge (J)hiladelphia : 
Westminster Press, 1984), t8. 
' Lindbeck, 33. 
4 Leslie Holmes, Po.�t-Commrmism: an introduction (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1997) 5. For the effects of 
this moral vacuum, sec S. f-landelman, Comrt1dr1 Crimi no/: The Theft of the Se,·ond Russian Re"'vlution (London: 
Michael Joseph,J994); and M. Brzezinski, CaslnoMoscow: A TalcofGrecdand Adwntureon Capitalism:,· Wildest 
Fronrier(Ncw York; Free Press. 2001). 
'Lindbeck. 35. 
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architecture, philosophy and political thought.4 At various times the leading role of the 
church in Russia has been contested and is onee more the subjeet of public debate. But 
whether the reaction to Orthodoxy is positive or negative, it remains a powerful cultural 
detenninant. 
It is clear that Onhodoxy has left a concrete legacy in the Russian language: the 
Cyoillic alphabet and much of the abstract vocabulary, even ceotain grammatical forms, can 
be traced back to Church Slavonic. The very idea of literacy is associated directly with the 
missionary activity of the church. Such a close historical connection between literacy and 
Orthodoxy has impootant implications for the way in which national identiry may be 
constnlcted. And it differs radically from the history of literacy in the West where the Roman 
alphabet predated the conversion to Christianity. 
Russian literature can also be shown to bear a strong Orthodox imprint. At a rather 
simple level it is possible to point to the large number o f  Russian writers who have dealt 
explicitly with religious questions or been interested in such matters. Dostoevsky comes 
immediately to mind as an outstanding example, but even an apparently secular author such 
as Chekhov wrote a remarkable short stooy with a religious theme, Sllldem ('The Student'). 
So numerous are the Russian writers7 who have been preoccupied with problems of 
spirituality that it is difficult to find comparable national literature in Europe that has treated 
spiritual themes so extensively. The same may be said of Russian philosophers.' If one seeks 
an explanation for this phenomenon, then it is possible to sunnisc that it reflects the relatively 
late secularization of Russia compared with Western Europe and demonstrates the prolonged 
influence of the church as the major cultural institution in society. 
In general one can argue that there can be no comprehension of Russian literary 
culture without an appreciation of the profound intluence of Orthodoxy on Russian writers 
and thinkers. Whether these writers have embraced Orthodoxy or rejected it in some way, it 
represents the conceptual foundation of the Russian culture. This is not to say that all 
Russian writers can be described as Orthodox or anti-0rthodox in a simple sectarian sense, 
f> Orlando Figes, Natasha's Dam .. :·e : A Cui JUral Histo ry of Russia (London: Penguin, 2003). 
1 We could also mention Tolstoy, Gogol', and Lcskov, as well as 20th cenn1ry writers like Bulgakov, 
Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn. 
' See Frederick Copleston, Philosophy in Rus ia jiwn Herzen 10 Lenin and Berdyaev (Tunbridge Wells, 
UK: Search Press. 1986): Bernice Glatzer Rosenthal and Martha Bohhchchcvsky-Chomiak (cds),A Revolution ofthe 
Spirit: Crisis q(Value in Russia. 1890·1924 (New York: Fordham Univ Press, 1990); Judilh Komblatl and R. 
Gustafson(eds), Russian Religious Thought(Madison: Univ. ofWisconsin Press, L996); and B. P. Vysheslavtsev, The 
Etenwl in Rus ian Philosophy. translated by Penelope V. Bun (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). 
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but rather that their cultural milieu has been so imbued with Orthodoxy that it cannot be 
understood apart from it. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Russian Federation 
the official government view of religion in Russia has been strictly secular. Not even a 
passing reference to God is made in the Constitution or the Preamble, and there is certainly 
no provision for an established church. The Constitution demands the absolute separation of 
church and state. Yet despite these constraints the Orthodox Church has become a vital 
component of Russian life and its prominent position has been much discussed. 
The consideration of religion, and specifically of Russian Orthodoxy, does not 
however play a prominent part in many recent assessments of the new Russia. The Austra.lian 
political scientist Leslie Holmes, for example, in a major introduction to post-communist 
Eastern Europe, makes very few references to the role of religion. The references he does 
make see religion as filling the already mentioned ·moral vacuum'' left by the demise of 
communism, and as representing a temporary process of 'retraditionalisation'10 that can be 
expected to decrease as Eastern Europe becomes increasingly integrated into the world 
community, especially through travel. He sees some deplorable elements in the re-emergence 
of religion, as 'greater tolerance by the state has in some cases been accompanied by greater 
intolerance by citizens, who use religious differences as a pretext for open conflict with their 
neighbors' .11 But this last statement is also a reason to take religion very seriously as a 
component, and more likely than not an enduring component, in the emerging Russian 
national identity. 
At. the same time it should be noted th11t even commentators who have attempted an 
objective and critical account of religion in the new Russia, while taking a firm stand on the 
need for a secular state, have come to acknowledge that the leading role of Orthodoxy in the 
search for identity is to be fully expected. As Alexander Agadjaoian writes: 
This enlisting of Orthodoxy in the shaping of the ·new nation' seems natural 
in Russia (if we take as our starting point the criteria (for the dialectical 
relationship between the identity of contemporary nations and religion) set 
out in the introduction), given its dominant position and clear links with a 
dominant ethnos.'2 
• llolmes, $. 
•• Holmes. 280 
11 Holmes, 278. 
•: Alexander AgadJan•an. 'Religious plurnlism and n:ulooal identity 1n Russia'. MOST Journal on 
Afulllculmrol Socielies. Vot.2, No.2, 2001, 15. available Dl hnp://www.unesco.org/moslfvl2n2au;o_cn.htm 
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If contemporary Russia cannot be adequately understood without acknowledgement 
of the role of religion, and specifically Otthodoxy within the new Russia, it is equally 
important that an understanding of Russian Orthodoxy itself be informed by an appropriate 
feel for the nuances of the Orthodox worldview and piety. As a corollary, a failure at either 
level - in the acknowledgement of the place of Orthodoxy, or in the appropriate apprehension 
of its worldview and piety - will lead to misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the new 
Russia. Andreas Buss offers a number of past misinterpretations of Orthodoxy and 
consequent misunderstandings of Russia itself, and the danger is that such past 
misunderstandings may reassert themselves. Some examples given by Buss are a failure to 
understand differing notions of sovereignty operating in Russia in the 19"' century," a failure 
of understanding that interpreted the 17'" century schism as a sott of eastern Protestantism," 
and perhaps most fundamentally, an inappropriate nominalist gloss on traditional Russian 
communalism which, Buss argues, should be understood in a far more realist (in the 
mediaeval sense) fashion.'5 
Assessments of the new Russia, and emerging national identity in this new context, 
cannot afford to overlook the religious element or to dismiss it as a passing phase. Rosenthal 
and Bohachevsky-Chomiak nOte the re-emergence of the religious philosophies of the late 
19" century in Russian intellect1tal life. from the 1970s onward. 16 Agadjanian tt-accs the post­
Soviet religious resurgence to a larger social and culrural change beginning as early as the 
1960s.11 It may well be that 'retraditionalisation' will fade into the background in time, 
obscuring but not fi.mdamentally changing or replacing the underlying elements of Orthodox 
world view and piety. It would be a mistake, for example, to consider the Orthodox Church as 
little more than a political player, or assume that because the Russian Federation has adopted 
a modern secular constirution that this accurately describes the national identity of its people. 
It may also be a mistake to consider the role of Orthodoxy in the new Russia as simply the 
equivalent of western, especially American, 'civic religion' characterised by religious 
behaviour of an essentially tolerant, lowest-common-denominator variety. I$ 
n Arldrcas Buss. The Russian-Orthodo.r Tr(ldition ond Modemity(Lcidcn & Boslon: Brill, 2003), 1680: 
" Buss, I 17 ff. 
•s Bus..c;� 22. 
16 Rosenthal and Bohhchchevsky-Chomiak., vii. 
11 Alexander Ag�djanian, 'Revising Pandora's Gifts: Religious and national lde.mity in the Post-Soviet 
Societal Ft1bric\ in Europe-Asia Studies, 53/3, 200 I, 473. 
13 Agadjanian, 'Revising Pandorn's Gifts', 482. 
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The Construction of Identity In tbc New Russia 
During the Soviet period a single ideology determined a particular concept of the 
nation, at that time constituted as the USSR. By contrast, in the post-Soviet period various 
sets of ideas have competed for dominance and the notion of Russia has been fiercely 
contested. It is a debate that is characterized by high emotion and intellectual virtuosity, but 
hardly corresponds to current public arguments in the West. It differs both in style and 
content. Tbe issues involved are felt to be profoundly important and are often expressed as 
matters of existential significance. 
When the Soviet Union disappeared and newly independent states were created in 
place of the constituent republics o f  the USSR, the experience of national independence was 
not the same in all the new sovereign states. For most countries the experience was a positive 
one of liberation from what was perceived to be an oppressive regime that stifled national 
aspirations. In the case of Russia the experience was ve•y different. Ce1tainly Russia became 
an independent sovereign state, but it also experienced a significant sense of loss. This was 
the loss of prestige and political influence that had been enjoyed when Russia and the Soviet 
Unioo had been closely identified with each other, certainly in the minds of many Russians. 
After all, the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic (RSFSR) had been by far the largest 
and most populous of the Soviet republics, the Russian language had served as the lingua 
franca of the USSR, and Moscow had been its capital. So the conflation of Russia with the 
USSR, while not strictly accurate, was strongly embedded in popular thinking and was 
retlected at the lexical level in the common use of Ros iia or Russia to refer to the Soviet 
Union. The misconception that this entailed may be important in an academic sense, but does 
not diminish the psychological significance of the identification of Russia with the Soviet 
Union for the constmction of the concept of the nation. Nor should the disappearance of the 
Soviet Union be underestimated as a factor contributing to widespread anxiety in Russia 
about the country's place in the world. This situation would seem to reflect a deep crisis of 
identity induced by the demise o f  the Soviet Union and the passing of a clearly defined notion 
of what constitutes the nation. The current debate about identity in Russia is therefore driven 
by the pressing need to re-invent the nation. 
What may be termed the official contempomry view of the nation is expressed in the 
Constitution of the Russian Federation. This is a model secular Constitution that eschews the 
rhetoric of nationalism and acknowledges Russia's place in the world community. It defines 
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the nation in strictly constitutional tcnns as a democratic state govemed by the mle of law in 
which power is vested in the people and all citizens have equal rights irrespective of their 
ethnicity. Such a view finds corresponding expression at the level of the lexicon in the 
deliberate and precise juxtaposition of the adjectives rossiiskii and russkii as distinct tenns 
denoting national and ethnic identity.•• Even the Preamble to the Constitution avoids 
refe1·ences to the glories of the past, but stresses the principles that should infonn the present 
and the future. It affirms the multiethnic character of the population by describing the people 
of Russia as mnogonacional'nyi. 
This official view of the nation depends for general support in Russia on widespread 
acceptance of the Constitution and the polity it defines as markers of national identity. Yet 
the Constitution lacks popular appeal and its status has been undermined. The previous 
Constitution of the USSR was seen by many as failing to guarantee the lawful conduct of 
political affairs, while in post-Soviet Russia there is also a widely held view of a discrepancy 
between tbe functioning of the political system and the requirements of the Constitution. 
If the Constitution does not serve as a strong marker of national identity in Russia, 
then the quest for identity will encourage other markers to take its place. And there is a 
tendency for traditional markers of identity to emerge as substitutes, since they arc already 
well-established as powerful labels of self-definition and have an emotional appeal and the 
weight of tradition that the recently written Constitution does not. Such a marker is the 
Orthodox faith. 
Orthodoxy as a Marker or Identity 
But while 01thodoxy functions as an important identity marker in this construction, it 
does not mean that it is confined to this role or that this role adequately represents it. There 
are significant doctrines of Orthodoxy that make claims to universality and that transcend 
notions of national and ethnic identity. Some within the Onhodox Church prefer to stress 
these doctrines, while others arc more inclined to emphasize its national importance. It is too 
simple to see the role of 01thodoxy simply in tenns either of idealist universalism or of 
(political) realism as a badge of identity giving rise to intolerance. 
The official view of the church proclaims its universal and supranational character. 
While also encouraging national loyalty, the church affirms the equality of all peoples and the 
1"' 'Ill is is discussed in greate1· detail by Jonathon Clarke. 'Language and the Construction of Jdentity in 
Russia' CERC, Working l'apers Series, no.l/2005. 
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subordination of the state to God. This dual emphasis is expressed in the words of the official 
website of the Moscow Patriarchate: 
By its very nan1re the Church has a universal and, consequently, 
supranational character. In the Church 'there is no distinction between Jew 
and Greek' [Rom.IO.J2]. ... 
However, the universal character of the Church does not mean that Christians 
should not have the right to national independence, to national self­
expression. On the contrary, the Church combines a universal origin with a 
national one. Thus, the Orthodox Church, while universal, consists of a 
multitude of Autocephalous Local Churches. Orthodox Christians, 
acknowledging that they are citizens of a heavenly country, ought not to 
forget about their earthly homeland . ... 
Contrary to Orthodox ethics is the division of peoples into superior and 
inferior, the belittling of any ethnic or civil nation. All the more 
incompatible with Orthodoxy are docn·ines which put the nation in the place 
of God or reduce faith to one of the aspects of national consciousness.'D 
If one seeks an explanation for the prominence of Orthodoxy in this construction of national 
identity, then it should be remembered that the Orthodox Church represents one of the very 
few public institutions from pre-revolutionary Russia that has survived the cataclysm of the 
Soviet period and continues t o  exist in the post-Soviet state that emerged after the 
disappearance of the USSR. In a country where the political structures have been subjected 
to two major social revolutions in less than eighty years, and where the polity has been 
fundamentally altered as a result, the church offers continuity with the past and a powerful 
means of self-definition. 
But what Orthodoxy provides in contemporary Russia is a sense of meaning that is 
difficult to derive simply from the political and economic system. It offers a coherent view of 
the world that clearly defines the place of the individual and affirms human identity as the 
image of God." Orthodoxy imparts value to the nation through its long and close association 
with Russian culture and history. Because it has endured the trials of the Soviet period i t  
remains a symbol of  continuity. At a time when the search for identity in Russia is so 
pressing, the concepn•al framework of Orthodoxy has enom1ous intellectual and emotional 
appeal. 
Hl From the official website of the Moscow Patriarchnre, available at 
http://www.mospat.rultext/conception/id/50.htn'll 
21 'Man is considered to be the highest exp•·ession of God's creative pi'Ocess, while God is regarded as the 
absolmevalue. the ultimate criterion of truth for all living creatures.' (Bishop Hilarion Alfeyev, 'Christianity and the 
Challenge ofMilirant Sec.ulariSI'I\' Paper read at the Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Association of 
11leologic�l Schools, 5-8 July 2004. Melbourne, I. 
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Tite strength of this appeal is not hard to demonstrate. It is reflected in the 
programme of a political patty like the Christian Democratic Party of Russia (Rossiiskaia 
Khrisliansko-Demokratid!skaia par!'ia) that shows the same reliance on the Orthodox view 
of humanity in relation to God: 
The permanent Christian value and basic principle of Christian democracy is 
the freedom and sovereignty of the human individual as the image and 
likeness of God. The lawful social state, whose basis is a humane democratic 
constitution, must become the chief guarantor of the free development both 
of the individual and of the society as a whole.u 
References to Orthodoxy abound i.o the press and even representatives of Russian 
popular culture articulate their devotion to Orthodoxy as a source of inspiration and renewal. 
As the rock musician Konstantin Kinchev stated forcefully in an interview published in 1997: 
Well, to speak now of culture in general is terrible. In as much as precisely 
what constituted the cultural wealth of Russia was being destroyed for 
seventy years. But, nevertheless, even today culture exists - in everything 
fundamental. The Orthodox Church exists, and there are creative 
personalities that understand the necessity of a Christian renaissancc.23 
To this w e  could add the rece nt statement by Pt·csidcnt Vladimir Putin on his visit to 
Mt Athos that the revival of faith was the foundation of the current rebirth of Russia, and that 
he welcomed the restoration of the historic relations between the Holy Mountain and the 
Russian state- relations that 'should be harmonious and based on absolute trust and common 
spiritunl ideals'.2' It is the nature of these 'common spiritual ideals' and this 'Christian 
renaissance' i n  Russia that needs S)�n\)athetic but nO\ uncritica\ theo\o<&ica\ exl!\otation. 
uSee the Pony's Programme (on Russian), available a t www.oha.ru/-rcdpllm aims.htm 
» Literatumojo ga:etu. IS Jonuary, 1997, No 1-2. 14. 
-
"Cited in Europau:o. N. 75 (October 2005) available a t: hl!p:lfwww.onbodoxeurope.o'l!f 
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